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Betting Big on CPEC
BY XIANGMING CHEN, S.K. JOSEPH AND HAMNA TARIQ
With the launch of  the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), one fundamental ques-
tion to ask is if  this ambitious 
project will transform Pakistan 
and boost China’s ambitious 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
In this article, the authors assess 
the potential and prospect of  
CPEC in terms of  its various 
opportunities and constraints and 
examine the economic potentials 
and social impacts of  CPEC from 
the Pakistani national perspec-
tive using a subnational and local 
lens as well as from the Chinese 
vantage point and draw the broad 
China
Photo: The Khunjerab Pass at China-Pakistan border. 
implications of  this two-sided 
analysis of  CPEC toward a prelim-
inary policy oriented conclusion.
Perched 4,693 metres above sea level in the Karakoram Mountains on Pakistan’s 
northern border with the south-
western region of  Xinjiang, China, 
Khunjerab Pass, with an interna-
tional border gate, stands lonely 
against the stunning snowy moun-
tains around. On the Chinese side, 
besides an isolated army border 
control station and few adventurous 
tourists, the Pass is accompanied 
by a few scattered yurts and rarely 
seen white mountain yaks. Yet this 
place in a remote corner of  the 
world heralds larger looming signif-
icance for both China and Pakistan. 
Its location defines the Pass as the 
only existing crossroad point for the 
ambitious China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) that both coun-
tries have committed to building. 
While there are relatively few freight 
lorries running along the highway 
(G314) leading from Kashgar, 
China’s westernmost city and closest 
city to the Pass, CPEC is touted as 
a difference-maker for boosting 
Pakistan’s economic development 
and China’s Belt and Road initiative 
(BRI). As Pakistan’s Prime Minister 
Shahid Khaqan Abbasi is quoted in 
the Long Term Plan (LTP) for China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (2017-2030), 
“Pakistan-China bilateral ties are time 
tested; our relationship has attained 
new heights after the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor that is a game 
changer for the region and beyond”.1
With over $50 billion up from the 
original $46 billion for infrastructure 
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construction mostly financed by China, CPEC is 
the single largest capitalised project ever mounted 
in Pakistan. It comprises the (re)construction of  
Gwadar port on the Indian Ocean, roads, rail-
ways, power stations and other facilities that 
aim to create sea-land transport connections 
between Gwadar and Kashgar. This south-
north corridor through the length of  Pakistan 
(see Map 1) is capable of  stimulating national 
and regional economic development at a scale 
and speed not seen before. From Kashgar as 
China’s terminus of  CPEC, this overland corridor 
will create the shortest access to sea for the coun-
try’s northwestern region and thus generating new 
growth momentum for this vast but lagging region. 
If  successfully implemented, CPEC can serve the 
crucial overland bridge for linking China’s Belt and 
Road (see Map 2).
Despite its hype for both Pakistan and China, 
as well as its broader regional and global impor-
tance, CPEC is just beginning to attract more 
attention as an ambitious cross-border project 
and a salient issue for research, although the 
latter has not kept pace with the project’s on-the-
ground development. 
CPEC from Pakistan’s National Perspective
In April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
visited Pakistan. This was the second visit of  
China’s top leader to Pakistan since the begin-
ning of  the 21st century after Hu Jintao's visit 
to Pakistan in 2006. During his visit, Xi stated, 
“this will be my first trip to Pakistan, but I feel 
as if  I am going to visit the home of  my own 
brother”, thus amplifying the friendly relations 
between both countries.2 As a result of  his visit, 
a total of  51 agreements were signed between 
China and Pakistan having a total worth of  $46 
billion which also included the development 
of  CPEC.3  The originally intended $46 billion 
investment for CPEC has since been raised to 
over $50 billion. The amount exceeds all foreign 
direct investment Pakistan has received over the 
last several years and is considerably more than 
all the aid Pakistan has received from the US 
since 9/11.4 This is more than 20% of  Pakistan’s 
2016 gross domestic product. 
This project is basically a collection 
of  infrastructure projects in Pakistan to 
develop Pakistan’s shattered economy. CPEC 
includes construction of  modern transporta-
tion networks, numerous energy projects and 
creation of  special economic zones. CPEC 
eventually aims at linking Pakistan’s port of  
Gwadar on the Indian Ocean to China’s 
landlocked Northwestern region of  Xinjiang 
through a vast network of  highways and rail-
ways. If  this project becomes reality, Pakistan 
will be having a massive new network of  roads, 
highways, railways and pipelines. The road will 
cover approximately 3,000 kilometers from 
Gwadar to Kashgar. The internal motorway is 
As a result of Xi's visit, a total of 51 agreements were signed between China and Pakistan having 
a total worth of $46 billion now over 50 billion which also included the development of CPEC. 
The originally intended $46 billion investment for CPEC has since been raised to $62 billion.
MAP 1: The Proposed $46-Billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor
SOURCE: WALL STREET JOURNAL, U.S. GLOBAL INVESTORS
China
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also a part of  this project, which will be about 1100 
kilometers long stretching from Lahore to Karachi, 
in addition to the Karakorum highway from Kashgar 
via Khunjrab Pass to Islamabad (Map 1). This is by 
far the largest infrastructural project ever mounted in 
the history of  Pakistan. Several projects are already 
underway and are expected to be completed by as 
early as 2018, with the short-term plan of  CPEC to be 
completed by 2020, the mid-term by 2025 and long-
term by 2030.5
Economic potentials
Pakistan will reap several much needed benefits from 
CPEC that can and will improve the country’s devel-
opment. First, CPEC is expected to enhance Pakistan’s 
employment opportunities along the route. Although 
thousands of  Chinese workers have been assigned 
to construct the railways, pipelines and roads, most 
construction workers are locals. CPEC is projected to 
generate 2,320,000 jobs ultimately reducing Pakistan’s 
unemployment rate from 5.5% to 3.9%.6 According to 
Pakistan’s Minister of  Planning and Development Ahsan 
Iqbal, at least 300,000 jobs have been created by CPEC 
thus far.7 A lot of  these jobs will be for building three 
routes of  roads to connect Gwadar to Kashgar, a consid-
erable improvement over the only road now. 
Stronger and more expansive transport infrastruc-
ture is expected to stimulate faster economic growth 
through more trade and investment. In fact, after the 
official launch of  CPEC in 2013, Pakistan’s GDP annual 
growth rose from 4% to 5.5% in 2016. According to 
an IMF estimate, investment in CPEC will add $3 to 
$13 billion in output to Pakistan’s GDP through 2024.8 
Other external advantages include greater trade through 
MAP 2: The Geographical Scope of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with Six Corridors
Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies, Berlin
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50 mountains over 7,000 metres. It is 
home to the world’s second highest 
peak K2 (Mount Godwin-Austen) 
straddling the China-Pakistan border 
and the Nanga Parbat, the world’s 9th 
highest peak in the Gilgit-Baltistan 
region of  Pakistan. Previously, 
foreign tourists had been hesitant 
to climb these wondrous peaks, but 
due to increase securitisation for the 
Chinese officials and transforma-
tive infrastructure construction, this 
breathtaking region is now deemed 
safe.10 Local demand for traveling 
within Pakistan is increasing year 
on year, with an expected number 
of  50-plus million domestic tour-
ists forecasted by the Pakistan 
Tourism Development Corporation 
(PTDC). CPEC is also expected to 
stimulate coastal tourism along the 
development axis between Karachi 
Port and Gwadar port as the two 
coastal centers or anchors of  CPEC. 
The Pakistani government is 
betting that faster economic growth 
and lower unemployment through 
CPEC can alleviate poverty and 
thus reduce the threat of  terrorism, 
especially in very poor and restive 
Baluchistan province. Pakistan has 
deployed a Special Security Division 
of  9,000 Pakistan Army soldiers 
and 6,000 paramilitary forces dedi-
cated to the security of  individuals 
working on CPEC, to prevent 
Chinese nationals from getting 
harmed.11 The LTP for CPEC calls 
for more rigorous safety precautions 
in the Gwadar region, especially at 
the port and in Gwadar Free Zone 
(see Photo 1). The management of  
Khunjerab Port will also be strength-
ened with 24-hour video surveillance 
along the China-Pakistan Highway 
from the border to Gwadar port.12 
These security measures add cost 
to both the realised and potential 
economic benefits of  CPEC. 
Social impacts
CPEC goes above and beyond its 
economic influence and has led to 
unforeseen social impacts that have 
left many Pakistani residents stunned. 
Mandarin Centers have cropped up 
to teach Mandarin to children as 
young as eight. Schools have realised 
the extent of  Chinese influence on 
Pakistani Society and have also started 
teaching Mandarin courses in class.13 
Thousands of  Chinese have settled 
not only in Gwadar and remote areas 
along the infrastructure routes and 
connections but also in the major cities 
of  Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi. 
Chinese superstores in Lahore sell 
spices exclusively imported from 
China. Lahore even has a traditional 
Chinese medicine hospital linked to 
CPEC (see Photo 2).
Most interestingly, the Pakistani 
media has attempted to appease a 
new national audience that has been 
exposed to growing Chinese influence. 
Chinese soap operas have replaced 
Gwadar port, which will play out 
its key location for facilitating trade 
among South Asia, Central Asia and 
the Middle East.  Pakistan will also 
benefit from improved energy supply 
as more China-invested and – built 
power stations come online. This, 
in conjunction with more special 
economic zones (SEZs) being built 
along the new or enhanced roadways, 
will allow Pakistan to strengthen its 
limited manufacturing sector, from 
assembling parts and components 
to localised production of  parts, and 
encourage more Chinese companies 
to build factories in Pakistan as envi-
sioned by the LTP for CPEC.9
CPEC will also improve Pakistan’s 
tainted international reputation. 
Tourism which currently makes up 
a small part of  Pakistan’s earnings 
can benefit. The cross-border region 
where the road from Kashgar starts 
is considered to be a mountaineer’s 
paradise, since it is home to five of  
the “eight-thousands” (peaks above 
8,000 metres), as well as more than 
China
Photo 1 : A Pakistani security guard at Gwadar port, in front of a Chinese container ship 
Source: http://cpecvela.com/cpec-effects-on-regional-connectivity/
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popular Turkish ones. The “Shan Masala” ad 
showing a Chinese woman in Pakistani clothes 
bringing Biryani to a Pakistani home has appealed 
to many locals. The Pakistani movie “Chalay 
Thay Saath” shows a budding romance between 
a Chinese male visitor to Pakistan and a Pakistani 
girl. While it may be too early to gauge the full 
social impact of  CPEC, the latter has already 
triggered direct sociocultural repercussions for 
Pakistani society despite the wide cultural and reli-
gious differences between the two countries.
Turning a Local Lens to CPEC
While the national perspective on CPEC has 
revealed its large scale and broad impact, we turn 
to a local lens to shed light on the highly differ-
entiated positions and roles of  Pakistani cities in 
CPEC. Gwadar emerged as the first choice for 
the starting point of  CPEC from southern end 
of  the proposed corridor. A small fishing village 
on the coast of  Makran with underdeveloped 
paved roads, schools and hospitals, Gwadar 
relied on exporting limited quantity of  seafood 
caught by small finishing boats. 
Since becoming the lynchpin of  the CPEC, this 
small fishing village has been slowly transformed 
into a growing modern city. Due to the joint 
efforts of  Pakistani and Chinese governments, 
Gwadar deep sea port has been built at a total 
cost of  $288 million14 and handed over to China 
Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) for 
operation. It is capable of  handling container 
offload of  300 to 400 million tons annually.15 
According to a local businessman, “the construc-
tion site was a century old fisherman’s settlement 
called Mullah Band. The Pakistani government 
had to pay owners in the area to move out of  
the area. They were promised a school, hospital 
and playground but progress has been slow.”16 
Over the past ten years, a high school with the 
playground has been established for students in 
Gwadar. An emergency hospital had been estab-
lished under CPEC at a cost of  $2.44million.17 
Despite positive spillover effects from these 
investment projects, some local residents 
complain about not given priority for employ-
ment at the port. According to a local laborer, 
“when CPEC started I was happy that people 
like me will have lot of  opportunities to make a 
decent living by working at the construction site 
but China has brought either its own workers or 
people of  Punjab (the most populous province 
of  Pakistan). They are taking away our living.”18 
The Baloch National Movement, a regional 
group advocating autonomy for Baluchistan 
where Gwadar is located, is against CPEC. 
Its leaders see CPEC as making the cause of  
obtaining autonomy even more difficult because 
a powerful China will be heavily vested in the 
region. Therefore, if  China and Pakistan want 
CPEC to be successful, then both countries need 
to make a serious effort to engage local people 
in the development process by providing more 
employment opportunities, which leads people to 
question China’s motives for CPEC.
While a deep sea port has been devel-
oped at Gwadar, SEZs have been planned to 
If China and Pakistan want CPEC to be 
successful, then both countries need to 
make a serious effort to engage local 
people in the development process by 
providing more employment opportunities.
Photo 2; A 
traditional Chinese 
medicine hospital 
linked to CPEC, 
Lahore, Pakistan 
Source: Photo by
Hamna Tariq
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its northeast, in the province of  Sindh. This 
includes Dhabeji, Thatta where 1000 acres have 
been set aside for the potential setup of  cement, 
steel, pharmaceutical and chemical plants.19 
Due to Dhabeji’s proximity to Karachi and ease 
of  connectivity through M3 motorway to the 
north and Markran Coastal Highway to Gwadar, 
Chinese investors have shown a great interest 
in this SEZ. Many local businessmen in Sindh 
also are very optimistic about SEZ in Dhabeji 
because they are hopeful that Sindh will return 
to its glory days of  industrialisation of  the 1970s 
when Karachi and its surround areas thrived 
with industrial activity. As a local businessman 
put it, “I am already buying land in Dhebeji to 
setup a restaurant in the vicinity of  the proposed 
plants because factory workers will buy lunch 
and dinner between their shifts. I remember in 
1970, Karachi and urban areas were lucrative 
business ventures for us. Lots of  foreigners also 
visited the area for business dealings.”20 CPEC 
will prove to be a major impetus for generating 
employment activity in Sindh province because 
government has signed a memorandum to 
provide tax holiday to plant owners and incen-
tives on hiring local workers. Local governments 
in Pakistan are trying to compete for Chinese 
investment, which has surpassed that from the 
US. Between 2013 and 2017, Chinese investment 
in Pakistan amounted to $1.2 billion compared 
to US investment at $505 million. Relative to 
Chinese investment’s intention to improve the 
economic situation of  average Pakistanis, many 
perceive American companies such as Philip 
Morris and Proctor & Gamble as investing only 
to enrich their subsidiaries in Pakistan.21
In northern Pakistan, Gilgit is the last major 
city before CPEC reaching the Chinese border 
and Kashgar. The most important section of  the 
highway running from Burhan, Hasan Abdal 
to Kashgar is called Karakoram Highway or 
KKH with a total length of  887 kilometers. 
Under CPEC, KKH is going through upgrades 
including the construction of  second lane 
to facilitate the traffic flow at a cost of  $1.26 
billion from China’s Import-Export Bank 
as a low interest loan.22 This has reduced the 
commuting time from Islamabad to Gilgit from 
28 hours to 16 hours. The immediate effects 
of  KKH enhancements are felt as domestic 
tourism has significantly increased. According 
to a local businessman, “it is due to CPEC that 
now we have a reliable highway connected both 
to the Chinese border and our city. The new 
road has brought 500,000 Pakistani tourists. 
I get my shipments from China on time and 
my customers are happy. I buy Chinese items 
because they are in demand such as dinner sets, 
clothes, appliances etc.”23 CPEC has begun to 
generate some sustainable economic activities 
in this remote region and lessen its dependence 
on government's monetary support. 
Another prominent CPEC project is a data 
cable from Gilgit to Islamabad at a total cost 
of  $44 million.24 The data cable will increase 
the Internet bandwidth for people in northern 
Pakistan. It will allow local businessmen to stay 
in touch with their Chinese counterparts through 
phone and the Internet. As this area has always 
been a historic trade route between traders 
in Xinjiang and Gilgit, enhancing road and 
communications linkages will further strengthen 
cross-border trade ties. Similar to the Pakistani 
government’s effort to secure Gwadar port, the 
Chinese government has provided funding for 
security vehicles to patrol the KKH regularly to 
maintain law and order in the area.25
The locals have mixed feeling about CPEC 
and its effects on Gilgit. On one hand, the busi-
ness community is very content that highway 
improvement makes it easier to trade as cargo can 
move with less delay; but at the same time, the 
businesspeople want projects that can and will do 
even more for economic development. People of  
Gilgit are happy to see more lorries pass through 
and drivers stop to buy food and spend money 
on lodging. In addition, they hope CPEC projects 
can generate employment on a larger scale. They 
CPEC will prove to be a major impetus for 
generating employment activity in Sindh 
province because government has signed a 
memorandum to provide tax holiday to plant 
owners and incentive on hiring local workers.
China
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want to see SEZs like the ones proposed in 
Sindh and elsewhere in Pakistan. The Pakistani 
government should take plight of  people in Gilgit 
very seriously because since the independence 
of  Pakistan, this area has remained very under-
developed. With CPEC, Pakistan has a great 
opportunity to develop this area and demonstrate 
its true commitment towards the people of  Gilgit. 
From a geostrategic point of  view, developing this 
area with an increased Chinese business presence 
will help to deter India’s long-standing claim for 
Gilgit Baltistan as an Indian territory. It may even 
create an opening for both India and Pakistan to 
resolve this territorial dispute and co-exist more 
peacefully on the Subcontinent. 
CPEC from the Chinese Side
From the Chinese side to echo Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister, CPEC represents, in President Xi’s own 
words, “a strategic decision by our two govern-
ments and peoples to build a China-Pakistan 
community of  shared destiny.”26 More strategi-
cally, China sees CPEC as the only one of  the 
six corridor-shaped components27 of  the BRI 
that can truly link the overland Belt and mari-
time Road (see Map 2). The BRI includes over 
60 countries, about 65% of  the global population 
and close to 40% of  the world’s GDP. Since its 
launch in 2013, China has invested $60 billion in 
BRI-related projects and is committed to invest 
$800 billion over the next five years.28 Enshrined 
into the Charter of  the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 2017, the BRI is advanced as heralding 
China’s new inclusive approach to globalisation by 
“promoting the connectivity of  Asian, European 
and African continents and their adjacent seas 
and establishing and strengthening partnerships 
among the countries along the Belt and Road.”29 
As an integral part of  the BRI, the implementa-
tion and success of  CPEC matters a great deal to 
China and its new stature and role in the global 
economy, much more than just solidifying an 
already close relationship with Pakistan.
The strategic significance of  CPEC has 
attracted China’s investment and operational 
priorities that are compatible with Pakistan’s. 
Gwadar port again stands out. Moving oil and 
goods from the Middle East and Eastern Africa 
through Gwadar to Xinjiang is over 10,000 kilo-
meters shorter than going around to China’s 
coast by sea. It also avoids sailing through the 
narrow and vulnerable choke point of  the Strait 
of  Malacca. China has pushed very hard to finish 
the upgrading of  Gwadar port, which became 
operational in November 2016. Moreover, China 
helped Pakistan to complete the first phase of  
the construction of  Gwadar Free Trade Zone in 
2017, a whole year of  schedule, and has already 
sunk $270 million into the project, with the 
remaining three phases to be completed by 2030 
when CPEC is scheduled to wrap up.
Up north, China has been assisting Pakistan 
to build the Karot Hydropower Dam Project 
on River Jehlum, a tributary of  the Indus River, 
located in Punjab province. With an installed 
capacity of  720MW and costing $1.4 billion, 
the Karot Dam will be Pakistan’s fifth largest 
and add considerable power supply to Pakistan’s 
most populous province and beyond. Broken 
ground at the beginning of  2016, the dam will 
create over 2000 jobs and be completed in 2020 
through built-operate-transfer (BOT). After 30 
years of  operation, it will be transferred to the 
Pakistani government. The project has already 
attracted a $300 million loan from China-led 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIID) 
and the first ever targeted financing by the Silk 
Road Fund linked with the BRI.30   Gwadar port 
and Karot dam exemplify China’s infrastruc-
ture-centric approach to working with Pakistan 
on CPEC.
Kashgar is the key
If  Gwadar, Karachi and Gilgit are key Pakistani 
cities for CPEC as discussed earlier, Kashgar of  
Xinjiang region, as China’s terminus of  CPEC, 
As an integral part of the BRI, the implementation and success of CPEC matters 
a great deal to China and its new stature and role in the global economy, much 
more than just solidifying an already close relationship with Pakistan.
Photo Above:
Pakistan’s new Karot 
Hydropower Project
Photo Source: https://
islamabadscene.com
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holds the key to China’s major efforts to make 
CPEC successful. Kashgar and other western 
cities began to benefit from growing investment 
and more favourable policies under China’s “Go 
West” development initiative launched in 2000. 
But the BRI and CPEC have accelerated the 
infusion of  domestic resources to Kashgar. In 
advancing both spatially targeted initiatives, the 
Chinese government has designated the most 
wealthy coastal cities of  Shenzhen and Shanghai 
as partners for directly supporting Kashgar’s 
development. This administrative fiat led the 
Shenzhen government to give $1.5 billion for 
building a new campus for the University 
of  Kashgar. Companies from Shenzhen and 
Shanghai have set up factories in Kashgar’s 
Economic and Technological Development 
Zone established in 2010. For example, with 
government financial incentives and guaranteed 
orders for army uniforms, a clothing company 
in Shenzhen has set up a large factory in the 
zone and sent technical supervisors to train the 
large number of  Uyghur women hired locally 
(see Photo 3). More recently, the Chinese state 
elevated an expansive region encompassing the 
city of  Kashgar to a national level SEZ, with the 
package of  special incentives originally granted 
only to Shenzhen and three other coastal SEZs. 
This designation is clearly intended to further 
elevate Kashgar’s crucial status and role in 
anchoring the Chinese end of  CPEC.
As an ancient Silk Road city, Kashgar is well 
located to facilitate the success of  CPEC as a 
crucial nexus for the BRI. Its historic bazaar, 
which served as a central market for the Silk 
Road for over 2,000 years, received a facelift in 
November 2017 when the Kashgar government 
announced that the bazaar would be relocated to 
the brand new and much more spacious Kashgar 
Central and Western Asia International Trade 
Center. An important project for 2018 built by 
wealthy Zhejiang province, the center will cost 
$708 million, have 1.35 million square metres of  
construction space, house over 10,000 vender 
stalls and create nearly 100,000 jobs for the central 
market and its various auxiliary facilities.31 Once 
completed, the new central market will attract 
more traders from Central and South Asia such as 
Kazakhstan and Pakistan who have trekked long 
distances to shop at the old bazaar (see Photo 
4). However, cross-border trade between China 
and Pakistan will continue to be limited by the 
single-lane road over high mountains through the 
Khunjerab Pass, which lies several driving hours 
away from the city of  Kashgar itself.          
Conclusion
The challenging natural terrain on either side of  
the Khunjerab Pass forms a formidable barrier to 
creating a smooth and sustainable long corridor 
of  commerce between Gwadar, Pakistan and 
Kashgar, China. It also symbolises the equally, if  
China
Photo 3 (left):
A Chinese foreman 
is supervising 
Uyghur female 
workers in a 
clothing factory set 
up by a company 
from Shenzhen, 
Kashgar, China
Source: Photo by
Xiangming Chen
Photo 4 (right): 
Pakistani shoppers 
at the central 
bazaar, Kashgar, 
China
Source: Photo by
Changhong Xu
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not more, challenging geopolitical obstacles to the 
success of  CPEC. India sees CPEC as a threat 
as it runs through or by the contested territory 
in Kashmir that India claims as its own. India is 
also worried that Pakistan and China use CPEC 
to counter India in jostling for influence in South 
Asia and beyond. In response, India has invested 
$85 million in Iran’s Chabahar port located near 
the Pakistani border and Gwadar port. Pressuring 
Pakistan on doing more to contain terrorism and 
in sympathy with India regarding CEPC, the US 
government has recently threatened to withdraw 
its massive aid to Pakistan. In quick and strong 
response, Pakistan decided to adopt the Chinese 
yuan (RMB) as an international currency, allowing 
deals to be done directly between the Pakistani 
rupee and Chinese yuan. The concern by both 
India and the US about the potential use of  
Gwadar port by the Chinese navy could lead to 
more tension surrounding CPEC.
While some of  the external environment 
may not be favourable to CPEC, the Pakistani 
government has firmly committed to the 
project’s economic rationales and goals in 
spite of  recent changes in its top leadership. 
As former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz told 
CNBC, “When you build a road or a highway 
through an area where there is none, you create 
economic activity, you create jobs, secondly 
new cities come up along that route, thirdly 
you have industrial estates coming so a lot of  
job creation takes place.”32 He went on to say, 
“We have seen over the years that in areas that 
have grown fast and where economic growth 
is strong, extremism and terrorism reduces.” 
This logic may have influenced the decision to 
choose Gwadar port in and road route through 
Baluchistan province, whose insurgency move-
ment has threatened political stability and led 
the Pakistani government to introduce special 
security to the region. The same rationale has 
also motivated the Chinese government to 
channel heavy investment into Kashgar for 
CPEC (see earlier) to improve the standard of  
living for the Uyghur population as an economic 
means of  countering its potential receptivity 
to the influence of  extreme Islamic ideology 
from across the border. It remains to be seen if  
CPEC can ultimately deliver this big combined 
economic-political benefit for both sides.
Finally, given the long-term horizon of  CPEC 
extending toward 2030, it is critical to anticipate 
the uncertain future of  Pakistan serving the 
large loans from China financing the massive 
infrastructure projects now and going forward. 
According to the Gwadar port revenue sharing 
and control agreement, China Overseas Ports 
Holding Company will receive 91% share of  the 
revenue while only 9% will go to Gwadar Port 
Authority for the next 40 years. Moreover, for 
the next 20 years Pakistan would have to repay 
$3.5 billion annually for loans taken under CPEC. 
CPEC loans may add $14 billion to Pakistan’s 
total public debt, raising it to $90 billion by 
June 2019.33 Due to China’s strict loan condi-
tions, Pakistan has recently excluded the $14 
billion Diamer-Bhasha dam on the Indus River 
in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir from CPEC, 
as this project also appears intrusive to India’s 
controlled Kashmir. Putting this uncertain or 
even risky prospect aside, Pakistan is betting big 
on CPEC as a potentially transformative devel-
opment project. And China is also betting big on 
it as the key to implementing the BRI. As both 
governments work to make CPEC successful, its 
ultimate impact should be measured by how it 
can really benefit the communities and people 
along this lengthy cross-border corridor.  
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